WORLDWIDE CHURCH OF GOD

WORLD HEADQUARTERS
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91123

HERBERT W. ARMSTRONG President and Pastor

February 9, 1979

DR. RODERICK C. MEREDITH
Director
Pastoral Administration

Dear Fellow Ministers:

Greetings again from Pasadena! I talked to Mr. Armstrong for about half an hour the other night, and his voice is strong and clear. He is in good spirits and good health, but still certainly needs the prayers of all of us--and I know he will have them.

Enclosed is a copy of the reporter's transcript of what amounted to a secret hearing before Judge Jerry Pacht. This was before the official hearing wherein the receivership was placed on God's Work. As the summary of Mr. Rader's press release about this indicates, this private meeting in Judge Pacht's chambers was "contrary to procedure and judicial ethics." And the same day Judge Pacht "rubber-stamped the order appointing Judge Weisman--which order had been previously prepared by the Deputy Attorney General."

Fellows, please read this transcript carefully. Some of you may wish to use material from this transcript to help your congregations understand why we feel the state has wrongfully handled this entire affair, and why we feel we have been unjustly treated in many, many ways.

Note especially page 2, lines 6-12, wherein the judge obviously realized what the plaintiffs sought was a "rather majestic order". Also, notice that he called the Big Sandy sale the "one cruncher". Yet the court in effect later admitted that this sale was proper and let it proceed!

Note page 3, lines 13-19, where Chodos is claiming God's Work and property is in effect the property of the State of California.

On page 9, line 24, note Judge Pacht's description of this Work of the Creator as "this bowl of spiders!"

No wonder Jesus talked about the "unjust judge" and NEVER pressed human jurisprudence in any of his teachings.

Fellow ministers, let's realize more than ever the real unseen power behind these attacks and go to our knees more than ever before! Please encourage the brethren to continue praying and fasting and asking our Redeemer to intervene and deliver us as soon as it may be within his will.

Now some happy news to close with! Please encourage your congregations with the good news that the temporary restraining order keeping the funds from the Big Sandy campus sale from coming to the receiver has been made in effect permanent! The order states that these funds are not to be released from the special account in Texas until the entire receivership issue is settled here in California so that such funds may go to the proper owner. So we can be grateful for that and for the fact that, increasingly, courts and officials outside California are beginning to help our cause and that the nationwide media is turning more and more in our favor. If we all keep close to God and ask for his guidance in every facet of this situation, we may be sure he will be with us and deliver us in due time and help us get back to the business of preaching his Gospel more powerfully than ever to a world that desperately needs this Work!

Your Brother in Christ,

Roderick C. Meredith

February 7, 1979

I appear before you--an angry man--but supported by the Living God, the power and glory of Jesus Christ, and the spiritual resources of His Church.

We have finally discovered the evidence that confirms without any doubt, that the receiver was appointed because of flagrant misrepresentations to the Court and, indeed, flagrant misconduct by the Attorney General, the receiver, the Plaintiff's Attorneys and the Court, itself.

We are distributing to the press here today and across the nation a newly discovered reporter's transcript of the secret proceedings before Judge Pacht on January 2, 1979--secret proceedings that resulted in the initial appointment of a receiver and the first restraining order. Judge Pacht's issuance of these orders has created a presumption of our wrong-doing in the minds of every Judge who has considered the matter since--resulting in the continual imposition of a receiver despite no evidence of wrongdoing.

This transcript shows that the would-be receiver, the Deputy Attorney General and plaintiff's counsel were granted an informal meeting with Judge Pacht even before any action was filed. This is contrary to procedure and judicial ethics. When Judge Pacht expressed his concern about the imposition of a receiver upon a Church, his concern was overcome by the Deputy Attorney General's misrepresentations that compelling evidence existed showing that the Church was preparing to sell its college in Big Sandy, Texas for \$20,000,000 below its true value. Judge Pacht called this the cruncher and told the Deputy Attorney General and the attorneys for the plaintiffs that he would grant the application for a receiver if it were filed.

Only after convincing themselves that they had been successful in deluding the court and would obtain its cooperation did the Deputy Attorney General file the complaint and application for the imposition of a receiver. Judge Pacht then rubber-stamped the order appointing Judge Weisman--which order had been previously prepared by the Deputy Attorney General.

When Judge Julius Title reviewed the order to determine if the receivership should continue, the Church again raised the question of the apparently nonexistent reporter's transcript and the Deputy Attorney General did not say a word. Earlier the court clerk had stated that there had been no court reporter present, and, hence no transcript. Notwithstanding the Attorney General's admission that he had failed to produce any convincing evidence that Big Sandy was about to be sold for \$20,000,000, below it's real value, Judge Title continued the receivership based upon a

presumption that Judge Pacht would never have appointed the receiver in the first place without a strong showing of serious improprieties.

It should be apparent to all, particularly after you will have studied the materials distributed to you today, that the Church has been railroaded as a result of misrepresentations, judge-shopping, and un-American presumptions of guilt!

We intend to bring this transcript with all of its most serious implications to the attention of the United States Attorney General, Mr. Griffin Bell, to the Council on Judicial Qualifications, to the State Bar Association, and to the State Attorney General, and to request an immediate investigation, disciplinary proceedings and such other relief as is indicated in order to correct the violent abuse of the Church's Constitutional Rights and to punish those responsible for an injustice that will bring the entirety of the Judicial System, the State Attorney General's Office and the State Bar into such a shameful light.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELFS DEPARTMENT NO. 85 HON. JERRY PACHT, JUDGE THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ex rel., ALVIN EARL TIMMONS, et al, Plaintiffs, Vs. NO. C 267 607 WORLDWIDE CHURCH OF GOD, INC., a California Corporation, et al, Defendants.

January 2, 1979

PATRICIA A. KUPFERER, CSR OFFICIAL REPORTER CER. NO. 1215

13

15

22

26

28

LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA. TUESDAY JANUARY 2. 1979, P.M. SESSION 0000

(The following proceedings were had in chambers:) THE COURT: This is the matter of The People of the State of California and others, versus Worldwide Church of God. Case Number C 267607.

MR. TAPPER: Lawrence R. Tapper for the California Attorney General.

MR. H. CHODOS - Hillel Chodos and Raphael Chodos for the Relators.

> MR. GIBSON: Hugh John Gibson for the relators. JUDGE WEISMAN: Steven S. Weisman.

THE COURT. All right. I have had an opportunity to read the Complaint: I have read the memorandum of points and authorities, quickly: I have read the declarations of Mr. Chodos Mr. Gibson. Mr. Chapman. Mr. Morgan, Mr. Timmons, and Shirley Timmons.

MP. H. CHODOS. Your Honor, I wanted to interrupt just to state for the record, a copy of the proposed pleadings was furnished to you this morning. The original is in my briefcase. It has not yet been filed, but we are prepared to file it and pay the necessary fee at any moment.

It is just that we did not want a public filing tefore coming to see you. I spoke to the clerk this morning and told him we would talk about that.

THE COURT: Well, we are going to have to get it filed if I am going to grant you any relief, as I am sure I don't have to tell you, Mr. Chodos.

MR. H. CHODOS: Yes, Your Honor. I just wanted to explain.

THE COURT: What I have read, obviously, are copies of documents which counsel furnished me. I am concerned about the scope of the relief that is sought.

I am concerned about the ex parte nature of the proceedings, and the rather majestic order which would flow from these proceedings without a hearing. I am not unmindful there are charges that dissipation of the properties may occur, and I am also not unmindful of the one cruncher, if you will, which is the proposed sale of the Big Sandy property on January 4th, or the proposed completion.

I have read the declarations pretty carefully. The rest of the matters, and some of the supporting data, obviously, in the length of time afforded to me, I have barely skimmed through; some of the financial matters which are referred to in one of the declarations -- I guess it is Mr. Chapman's declaration -- are matters which I have just glanced at; obviously, I haven't digested those in any form.

I would like to be enlightened, perhaps, about how far my writ runs in the first place. Can I really do anything about a real property transaction which is going to close, apparently, in Texas? I don't have anybody before me, as I understand it. I will have somebody before me if I issue this order in due course. Presumably, Mr. Rader or Mr. Herbert Armstrong or somebody will be served.

Let me hear from the Attorney General or from Mr. Chodos, whoever is carrying the ball here.

MR. H. CHODOS: If I can just make a few observations. First of all, I recognize that any request for an ex parte receiver, without notice, has to be viewed against a strong presumption that it is an emergency measure to be used with great caution.

I would suggest to you, however, that at least insofar as pertains to the Worldwide Church of God, Inc., Ambassador College, Inc., and Ambassador International Cultural Foundation, Inc., that the usual principles are not applicable.

All of those corporations are organized and existing under California law, exclusively for charitable, religious and educational purposes.

It is our position that a shorthand way of describing the law applicable to the corporations of that type is that their property always and ultimately rests in the Court's custody, and they are always and ultimately subject to the supervision of the Court on the application of the Attorney General. In effect, there are no private interests.

The Court is not taking something away from somebody or interferring with anyone's private rights. In effect, what we are saying is that there are presently trustees who have been allowed to manage the charitable fund on a day-to-day basis.

There is reason to believe, as we have shown you, that they have not done their job in a faithful manner. We believe that essentially those trustees serve at the Court's pleasure, and may be replaced with a more trustworthy

trustee.

THE COURT: I don't have any quarrel with that up to there, and I think you make a prima facie showing that there may be some serious problems in the administration of this trust.

MR. CHODOS: Now, turning to how far the Court's writ runs. I am inclined to believe that the Court's writ does not run to land outside the State of California.

THE COURT: I learned it only runs halfway across the dining room table, so as my children want to point out to me, let alone past the State line.

So you have got to give me a little jurisdiction and a little power if you want some help.

MR. CHODOS: It does run, however, to all persons within the Court's jurisdiction, and particularly, to charitable trusts which are organizing and existing under the State of California.

In fact, this Court, as I understand it, is the only court that has complete jurisdiction and supervision over the affairs of these three charitable corporations.

Now, it may be that you will appoint a trustee for these funds, Judge Weisman, and that he will then be confronted with the claims of third parties in Texas.

Now, he, after all, will stand only in the shoes of the present trustees. His rights and privileges will be no greater or no less, and he may have to submit to demands by the people if they are meritorious, or litigate them if they are questionable, or resist them if they are not. But

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

he has to do that in the name of and on behalf of the charitable funds and this Court.

Now, the real problem, therefore, I don't know what can be done if the land has chaged hands by the time we get to it, we may have to sue to rescind in the Texas courts.

It is my understanding that a receiver has, under that statute, the power to sue and be sued in other actions on behalf of the interest he represents.

THE COURT: The order which would be drawn appointing him can specifically grant him that power, and he may have it inherently.

That is right. Furthermore, I believe MR. H. CHODOS: that -- Well, let me say, what we are asking here -- and it may be that the order -- the temporary order perhaps should be more limited in scope than the order to show cause. one thing that is clear to me that you have the power to do is to appoint a receiver for the three charitable corporations. The other corporations we have named are alleged to be fronts, depositories of charitable funds.

We have substantial reason to believe that that is true and that we can prove it. But it may be that the taking control of those entities and the interference with those entities ought to be postponed until after a hearing has been held.

But for the charitable corporations themselves, we have a substantial chance of emmence dissipation in the immediate future. And in the nature of things, we believe

 that it would be much more costly, and ultimately, therefore, an unnecessary drain on the charitable trusts to put the receiver in the position of having to rescind a consummated transaction when he might be able to avoid an unconsummated transaction.

Now, I will point out to the Court, too, that if the transaction is not consummated, the chances are good of litigating this matter in California. If they are consummated, the chances are good we will have to litigate it in Texas.

My experience with Texas law is that they have a somewhat different view of the applicable principles than the California courts, and it takes a little while getting acclimated to it.

Now, I don't know if I have answered Your Honor's question about the scope of your writ and the extent of your jurisdiction.

THE COURT: What about the ex parte nature? I read your moving papers, I read your moving declaration, and someone seems to be alarmed at the potential for file shredding or the destruction of documents or records.

MR. TAPPER: Maybe I could dispel that, Judge.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. TAPPER: I am reminded of the words of Shirley
Hufstedler when she was in the Court of Appeal, and it was
no more certain as to the plaintiff's rights in terms of
their being finally defined as it is here, but there is strong
reason to be suspicious, and she said, "What the defendant

suggest is that the plaintiff should take a taste to determine whether it is a mushroom or a toadstool." And that is essentially what we are faced with here.

Nobody can tell Your Honor how many pieces of paper are being shredded per minute, per hour, per day.

THE COURT: If any.

MR. TAPPER: If any. We do believe that they are being shredded. We don't believe that the information that there is a shredder in his offices is fictional; but by the same token, we haven't seen the shredder.

THE COURT: There can also be ligitimate uses for them, although maybe we ought to tell the city attorney that.

Go ahead.

MR. TAPPER: I suppose. But the records we are talking about are public records, just as the assets that Hillel, in describing the charitable organizations, are also public assets.

I share the thought that perhaps it will be premature to use these remedies ex parte as to non-charitable entities at this time, but I am very concerned about the Big Sandy transaction. I am very concerned about the evidence that has been presented to us of some fifty -- I haven't seen all the deeds -- but it is alleged that there have been fifty real estate transactions in a period of five to six months. That works out to ten per month. So if it is just merely on an averaging basis, there is a virtual certainty that there are going to be some more pieces of real estate that are going to change hands, and that, again, is going

to be even further litigation trying to recover the property.

\$

e

1.3

THE COURT: These are pieces which, as I recall it, have stood in the name of one or more of the charitable corporations and being deeded out to individuals.

MR. TAPPER: That is correct. Ambassador College, for example. I believe that the case of People versus Christ's Church of the Colden Rele is practically on all fours.

I think that what has been presented to us is sufficiently strong that we must take immediate action.

A great deal of effort went into bringing this to Your Honor as early as it has been brought to you, and I would urge the Court to favorably consider the relief, at least as to the charitable entities.

MR. CHODOS: May I add just one thing. People versus Christ's Church of the Golden Rule deals — we quoted extensively from it — emphasizes the difficulties of a plaintiff in the position of the Attorney General or the Relators where information has been withheld. It emphasizes the discretion of the court to grant ex parte relief where the cincumstances justify it. But, furthermore, and most important, I want to emphasize that the usual impediment to granting ex parte relief does not exist here.

Normally, in a private property situation where you grant ex parte relief, the court is put in a position of attempting to interfere with someone's rights, and to stop people from doing things that they would otherwise do with their own property, and maybe create great havoc to private interests that have not had an opportunity to be

:_

heard, and that is the power that should be exercised with great skepticism and great reservation.

In this case, however, there are no private transactions. In other words, if you appoint an ex parte receiver, all that is going to happen is that he is going to take custody of the records and preserve them; take custody of the money and preserve it; take custody of the causes of action and preserve that; and he is going to be prepared to come back into this court, at any time starting tomorrow morning, that you want to make returnable, or that counsel wants to come in here for an ex parte conference, to vacate the order and talk about it.

But in the interim, what I am really trying to emphasize to you is there is no one whose interests can be hurt. Only protection can be granted by an ex parte order, and there is --

THE COURT: Well, we could hurt some interests, according to the thrust of what you have spelled out. They would be interests, if the moving papers are accurate, inappropriately acquired. So we are mindful of that.

Does the record reflect that Judge Weisman is here with us, Patty?

THE REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It has been urged that this bowl of spiders be put in your custody. Before I get involved in orders or making orders or granting relief, are you willing to become involved in it?

JUDGE WEISMAN: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: As a receiver?

JUDGE WEISMAN: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: And you see no impediment that would prevent you from acting, if you were thrust --

JUDGE WEISMAN: The only impediment I know of is my polio, and that won't prevent me --

THE COURT: You have managed pretty well with that for some time.

I will tell you on the record that I am a little queasy about putting somebody in charge, but I think you have a showing which warrants some relief.

I would like to discuss with counsel the temporary -- proposed temporary restraining order, or order to show cause, because I think we might want to chop it up a little bit in line with the suggestions that have been made about limiting the order to the charitable corporations.

I am addressing your attention to the proposed order appointing temporary receiver, temporary restraining order and order to show cause re receiver and injunction.

MR. H. CHODOS: Would you like to have original order just to work on?

THE COURT: Might as well work from a copy in case we change things. And we are going to want you to file as soon as we get this --

MR. H. CHODOS: I am prepared to do so.

THE COURT: Let's go through it with you. Let me see your Complaint, because it names the defendants. And I take it you want this order to run, so far as the order

to show cause is concerned, against everybody; is that right?

MR. H. CHODOS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In line with the suggestion about limiting to the charitable corporations, I am looking at Paragraph, Sub-B, on Page 2, at Line 17. Would it be necessary, with that thought in mind, to have limiting language at that point?

MR. H. CHODOS: Well, it seems to me, Your Honor, that at the hearing on the order to show cause, after there is notice, the Court has power to extend the injunction to all the defendants, and that the proper time to limit it is when the responsive showing is made.

THE COURT: All right. In other words, what you are really saying is that the temporary restraining order is the only one which should be limited, the proposed temporary restraining order.

MR. H. CHODOS: That is our position.

THE COURT: All right. I have read your bond argument. Are you suggesting that despite what is contained on Page 3, at Line 5, that no bond is required at all?

MR. H. CHODOS: No, Your Honor. We believe that no bond -- In a receiver action, there are two bonds. One is from the plaintiff --

THE COURT: You are talking about the receiver's bond?

MR. H. CHODOS: This is the receiver's bond, and I

believe Judge Weisman must post a bond.

THE COURT: All right. What would you suggest that bond ought to be?

MR. H. CHODOS: Well, the only thing I can say is this, Your Honor: There are \$80 million of assets, which would be in Judge Weisman's charge. It is my view that you could put \$80 million in crumpled \$20 bills in Judge Weisman's briefcase and not worry about it.

THE COURT: Ruin his briefcase.

MR. H. CHODOS: Yes. It would be, in my opinion -- I have spoken to a bonding agent who is prepared to provide a bond, within limits, and he tells me the likely premium is one percent of the face amount. The premium, of course, is a charge on the charitable trust.

I believe, under those circumstances, a relatively nominal bond for a temporary period is appropriate. I would say \$1,000, or \$10,000, whatever Your Honor considers nominal under those circumstances.

THE COURT: I am still impressed with \$10,000, but I am going to make it a \$10,000 bond, and that will, of course, be subject to an argument if this matter comes back to me.

Now, we will need to redraw, it seems to me, Paragraph 3, or will we?

I will hear from you about that.

MR. H. CHODOS: I think in view of Your Honor's remark, all that would need to be done is starting with the words "Wilshire Travel" on Line 13, and extending down to the words "in California" on Line 17, that if that passage would be deleted, that this would conform to what you have indicated.

THE COURT: That sounds like it would be appropriate, and I am physically deleting on the copy those portions which

which you suggest be deleted.

What is the soonest you believe you can get these people served?

MR. H. CHODOS: I am hopeful, Your Honor, making an order today, that we could have these people served by noon tomorrow. Most of them, I think, will not be evading service.

THE COURT: I will make it by January 4th, at 5:00 PM. Give you a little more time. So far as the return date, that is up to Ms. Follings outside.

Let me say this: Somebody is going to have a career as a judicial officer in this. I am not sure that the limitations which are imposed on this department by the workload, which I just looked at for the next calendar, will permit this matter to remain here.

I think you are going to need somebody in the nature of an all-purpose judge to take hold of this. Now, whether Judge Schauer will do that, whether he will want me to refer it ultimately to Judge Weil to be handled as an overflow matter, I am not sure.

I doubt very much, foreseeing what inevitably has to happen in this case, whether it can be comfortably accommodated on the 8th floor, and allow us to get any other work done, unless everybody caves in, agrees or elects a new board, or something remarkable will happen.

I think what I have indicated is what I will sign as soon as the appropriately filed papers are presented to me. And we'll set down your order, appoint Judge Weisman

temporarily, pending the return date.

MR. TAPPER: Do you want to pick a date? Pages 1 or 2.

MR. II. CHODOS: He wants Marjorie to do that.

THE COURT: I don't know anything about what our calendar problems are. I have a couple of personal calendar problems which involve -- one of which involves the 26th of January, at least at current rating.

MR. H. CHODOS: The statute requires within ten days.

THE COURT: Is it ten? Let's get Marge and get

the latest date we can give you. You better get it filed.

MR. H. CHODOS: Yes. If Your Honor please, if we can be excused, I'll go out to your table outside and prepare our papers, get the bond and make all those arrangements.

THE COURT: I will be here, I am sorry to say.

(Proceedings concluded.)

-000-

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
COUNTY OF LOS ANCELES)

ن،

I, PATRICIA A. KUPFFRFR, CSR, an Official
Reporter of the Superior Court of the State of California,
for the County of Los Angeles, do hereby certify that the
foregoing 14 pages comprise a full, true and correct
transcript of the proceedings held in the within-entitled
cause on January 2, 1979, in Department 85 of the Superior
Court, before the Hon. Jerry Pacht, Judge.

Dated this 6th day of February, 1979.

Official Reporter, Cer. No. 1215